

## **about the operation and organization of the raf**

andreas baader, note for statements at the stammheim trial, july 1976

the raf's attack on the u.s. presence in germany begins at the high point of the vietnam war.

the individual tactical/operational steps that one can talk about here were:

- the attack on the cia headquarters in frankfurt;
- the attack on the u.s. troop headquarters in heidelberg;
- the kidnapping of the west berlin allied commanders.

in this regard, there were two levels to the organization of information:

a.

1. on the basis of the centralization/coordination of the information available to individual groups/units – the process of theoretical work and in practice: verification, contacts, connections.
2. through an information network available to the raf through universities, journalists, etc.

b.

1. through lines of communication with aboveground anti-imperialist groups in the federal republic – e.g. their archives, research, analyses, etc.; and in cases where they worked with gis, their information as well.
2. through lines of communication with illegal gi resistance organizations in the u.s. army.
3. through lines of communication with third world liberation movements – and their information – likely unspecified intelligence material that we didn't use.

with regard to the level of information, the overall plan of attack was further and more precisely elaborated and structured than we wish to disclose here; and this included the possibility of a qualitative escalation. (the possible reactions and consequences that could be anticipated on a national level – the federal republic – and on an international level – western europe/usa – were also integrated into the plan. there are two well-founded analyses, which probably found their way into the hands of the bka.)

in 1972, the raf was made up of eight groups in six large cities: in two cities there were at the time two – strong – groups. the groups were anchored in the aboveground opposition in the federal republic – regionally and nationally. the entire underground structure was made up of and developed by forty-eight guerillas, who were also responsible for the organization of information and logistical structures, structures allowing for interaction with aboveground groups, universities, etc., and with the factory-based guerilla groups that were being formed here along the lines of the italian model.

what is essential is that the entire guerilla structure – that is to say, the eight groups in the six cities – determined the overall development of the line and shared responsibility for the decision to attack the u.s. presence – the cia headquarters/the army headquarters/the allied commanders – on the basis of that line. that is to say, the immediate decision-making process included the forty-eight guerillas, while the political discussions about the strategic purpose involved a substantially larger militant scene in an open discussion.

müller's so-called "principle of open groups" did not exist in the raf.

within the groups, everyone had the information necessary for the group's immediate logistical upkeep. the communication between individual groups was determined functionally: the raf's strategic discussion and decision-making process unfolded horizontally between the groups based on what was objectively possible and according to the principles of persuasion and unity. that is to say, the decisions were made collectively by all of the groups in the raf and by each individual. that is to say, there were no decisions that were forced through over the opposition of individuals or individual groups.

the basis of this structure for each individual guerilla is freedom of choice and collectivity.

tactical and operational decisions were independently determined and conducted by individual units in keeping with their strategic priorities, as was the practical preparation and execution of actions.

müller was part of one of these units. he knew the contacts who were necessary for its logistical maintenance – he betrayed them all.

however, he did not know all of his group's contacts, not by a long shot. and he had no information about other units' contacts, nor did he know the other units.

he was no cadre.