


Footnotes:

- 1) "Gulf Oil in South Korea: The Influence of a Global Corporation", Korea Report, American Friends Service Committee, April 1979; Asia Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1978
- 2) Korea Times, 2/4/78
- 3) Korea Times, 6/23/78
- 4) AFSC, *ef supra* # 1
- 5) *ibid.*
- 6) *ibid.*
- 7) Washington Post, 6/19/80, p.A-27
- 8) "Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation", December 1975
- 9) *cf supra* # 7



MOSSAD IN WEST GERMANY

by Konrad Ege

On August 9, 1979, the Washington Post reported on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies operating in the U.S. in violation of U.S. sovereignty. Now West Germany has a similar scandal, and many questions are still unanswered.

On October 29, 1979, the West German weekly Der Spiegel reported that, despite governmental denials, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, West Germany's CIA) had allowed MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) officers to secretly interrogate several Palestinians charged with "terrorist activities" in jails and prisons in Munich, Amberg, Straubing, and Landsberg. A number of the summaries of the interrogations - written by MOSSAD officers - were then to be used in the court proceedings against the Palestinians, who were not informed about the identities of their interrogators.

According to the Palestinian news

agency Wafa, the MOSSAD officers did more than "just" ask questions. Wafa reported that one PLO fighter had been tortured and administered drugs by Israeli intelligence officers in Straubing, and had been pressured to assassinate the PLO's intelligence chief, Abu Ijad. However, Wafa said, he chose instead to take his own life.

The West German authorities knew well the man to whom Wafa was referring. His name is Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Abed. He and others were arrested on the West German border when they allegedly tried to smuggle explosives into West Germany. While his co-defendants got prison sentences of several years, Abed was sentenced to only four months imprisonment.

After being released, he went back to Beirut, Lebanon, where he shortly thereafter entered a mental hospital. As Wafa reports, it was then that he told Abu Ijad how he had been administered drugs in Straubing, and how Israeli officials had shown him pictures of his family, who lives on the occupied West Bank, and told him that he had better collaborate for their sake.

A few days later, Abed was found

dead in his apartment. In a letter he left to explain his suicide he wrote that he felt he was in a "no-way-out" situation; his resistance had been broken with drugs in Straubing, and he saw no other way to protect his family than to kill himself.

While discounting Wafa's version of Aabed's death, the West German government was forced to admit two facts: that Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Aabed was interrogated by Israelis in Straubing, and that he was administered drugs in prison because, so the official version goes, "he was depressed" (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 11/9/79, p.3).

Having had to admit interrogations of Aabed and other Palestinians by Israeli intelligence officers in four prisons, West German governmental officials were quick to assert that these cases were "isolated incidents". New evidence uncovered in the meantime, however, leads one to the conclusion that these cases might rather be part of common practice.

Die Tageszeitung, a left Berlin daily, wrote on November 1, 1979 that at least two imprisoned Palestinians were questioned by a West German plain-cloth police officer accompanied by an Arabic speaking "translator" who actually carried out the interrogation. Courts in Berlin repeatedly refused to examine these and other charges of "translators" who were allowed to interrogate Palestinian prisoners.

Reports about these interrogations have raised several questions about the role of foreign intelligence agencies in West German prisons in general. One of the questions is whether the shah of Iran's secret police, SAVAK, were ever allowed into West German prisons. While collaboration between West German intelligence agencies and SAVAK has been documented, this contention is strongly denied by West German authorities.

Still another serious and for the West German government very uncomfortable question was raised after the publication of MOSSAD interrogations and the claims of a West German intelligence officer in the Swedish social democratic Aftonbladet. This question is: How did Gudrun Ensslin, Jan Carl Raspe, and Andreas Baader die on the night of October 18, 1977? The three were members of the Red Army Fraction (an organization advocating armed struggle)

and at the time imprisoned in Stammheim, West Germany's most "advanced" maximum security prison. The West German government claims they committed suicide.

Aftonbladet and others have pointed out that a good part of the governmental version of events is simply incoherent. Important details are missing or remain unexplained. On October 21 last year Aftonbladet wrote: "It is not just the so called West German left that is very sceptical about the official version of events in Stammheim. There are people within the West German intelligence agencies who refuse to believe it was suicide. One intelligence officer .. said: 'I believe they (Raspe, Baader, and Ensslin) were assassinated, but I don't believe it was our people who killed them'".

Some people now wonder aloud whether the publication of Israeli activities in West German prisons might have brought us one step closer to the answer of "Who did it?".

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MOSSAD'S LONG ARM

by Robin Rubin

On September 12, 1979, two West German citizens, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter were convicted of "anti-Israeli activities" by a secret Israeli military tribunal and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The same secret trial is continuing for three Palestinian defendants, Husain Hadi al-Attar, Mahmoud Musa Hasan al-Makussi and Ibrahim Twafiq Ibrahim Yusuf.

The three Palestinians had been arrested by Kenyan authorities in Nairobi on January 18, 1976, and were interrogated -- before being charged -- at military headquarters in Nairobi by MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) officers. Nine days later, Reuter and Schulz were arrested in their Nairobi apartment; and on February 3, the five of them were taken to a secret military camp in Israel. They were transferred in a disguised Israeli El Al airplane in blatant violation of international law since there were no extradition hearings and Kenya does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with Israel.

The five were held incommunicado and interrogated for four months by the Shin Beth (Israel's internal intelligence organization) during which they claim they were severely tortured to extract confessions of guilt. It was well over a year after their arrest that they were charged with conspiring to shoot down an El Al plane, and before their lawyer Lea Tsemel, who had been retained by the Schulz family, received confirmation from the Israeli Defense Ministry that Schulz was in custody in Israel. Likewise, it took the West German Foreign Ministry until March 19, 1977 to notify the families that their relatives had been detained in Israel for over one year.

According to Brigitte Schulz, it is very likely that West German police and/or intelligence assisted the Israelis. For example, after Schulz had arrived in the Israeli camp, Shin Beth officers showed her an extensive dossier describing her political activities inside West Germany. Much of the

file dealt with her activities and her concern with the denial of human rights to political prisoners in West Germany. Presumably, the Israelis were given this dossier by West German authorities.

In April 1977, an official from the West German embassy in Israel was allowed into the trial as the only outside observer. The families in West Germany learned about the trial date from the press. Professor Pierre Mertens, a member of the Belgian League of Human Rights, who was retained by the parents to observe the trial, was prevented by the Israeli government from attending any court sessions.

The secret military tribunal was composed of military and intelligence officers. One of the judges, in fact, was a member of the military intelligence unit that had extracted "confessions" in the secret military camp. The secretiveness and the lack of independence between the judiciary and the police departments violated international standards for a fair trial.

Two "cover papers" issued by consecutive Israeli Defense Ministers, Shimon Peres and Ezer Weizman, forbade the defendants from testifying on their behalf about the circumstances surrounding their arrests, extradition from Kenya, and interrogation in Israel. The army further denied Reuter and Schulz their choice of attorneys and instituted a variety of other measures eliminating any possibility of justice.

At the same time, the Israeli government realized that it was in a delicate situation particularly since it was not able to provide convincing evidence against the five defendants. Pressed by growing international awareness of the incident, the Israeli government attempted to strike a deal with the two Germans: they should plead guilty to charges of conspiring to shoot down an El Al plane, and then they would be released after five years imprisonment. Both refused to accept this offer, termed "blackmail" by Amnesty International, since they saw it as an attempt to coerce them into participating in a cover-up of the true nature of the case.

On September 12, 1979, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter were sentenced to ten years imprisonment. This was

the public side of another secret agreement, which, unlike the previous one, was proposed by Schulz and Reuter, who saw it as the only possibility to regain freedom in the foreseeable future. They agreed to plead guilt to non-specific "anti-Israeli activities" in return for the government's dropping of all other charges. Furthermore, Israel was to agree, in writing, to their release in February 1981. The Israeli government was compelled by the increasing public pressure to accept this proposal.

The fate of the three Palestinians is still unresolved. Since the Israeli authorities separated the German from the Palestinian cases, no information has been available. Their case has continued on its original basis, and it is generally presumed that their sentences will be much harsher than that of Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter.

This case illustrates the Israeli method for dealing with political oppo-

sition from abroad by citizens of other countries. In the past few years there have been an increasing number of political charges against foreigners. For example, a Dutch man, Gerd Dessen, a member of the Dutch Palestine Solidarity Committee, was kidnapped on the high seas between Lebanon and Cyprus, by Israeli authorities and held for a week in an Israeli prison. The Cypriot journalist, Panayiotis Paschalis, was arrested as a foreign agent for interviewing Palestinians and Israelis. Terre Fleener and Sami Esmail, both U.S. citizens and now free, were arrested and sent to prison on charges of aiding various alleged terrorist organizations.

It appears likely that this systematic, cross-border repression of any political opposition will continue for Palestinians and foreigners alike until the wider aspects of the regional and international political situation of Israel and the Arab world have been resolved.

CIA-IMF-WORLD BANK-AID: COUNTER- INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

By Robin Broad

(Ed. note: Robin Broad is working on her Ph.D. in Princeton University. She has lived in Thailand, and written extensively on Southeast Asia.)

This article was completed before General Kriangsak stepped down as prime minister in the spring of 1980. In his place the Monarchy put General Prem Tinsulanond. While cosmetic, this change is not without significance. Strongly backed by the royalists, Prem has made initial gestures indicating that his administration will strive further to accommodate foreign investment. Moreover, Prem is shrewdly attempting to incorporate within his administration

those nationalist factors among the Bangkok elite who could potentially form an important component of the Thai left.)

Anyone acquainted with the policies of Thailand smiles in anticipation as October rolls around, for October is the month of coups in that Southeast Asian country. Destabilizations of Thai governments have played no small part in that nation's history. Indeed, since 1932 when the absolute monarchy gave way to a constitutional monarchy, Thailand has weathered the coming and going of eleven constitutions, twelve elections, forty-two cabinets and fifteen prime ministers. The last group has been split between six military officers, ruling for a total of thirty-five years, and nine civilians, whose rule summed up a mere eleven years in comparison. Several of the civilian governments were, in actuality, puppets of the military.

This article will concentrate on how the United States, through the CIA and its domination of both bilateral and mul-